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NOTES AND COMMENT
make a recommendation to the appeal board. Such recommendation
is purely advisory, however, and the board need not follow it.59
Because the adjudication of another man's conscience is always
a delicate task and often an impossible one, the provisions for deter-
mining and classifying conscientious objectors will never be entirely
satisfactory. The formulation of determined methods of procedure
and rules of evidence in the examination of those claiming to be con-
scientious objectors would undoubtedly lessen, but could hardly elim-
inate, the dissatisfaction and charges of injustice that will inevitably
arise. The chief difficulties, however, will probably grow out of the
human element in the machinery of administration and in this regard
the close cooperation which has been effected between the Director of
the Selective Service Act and the National Service Board for Con-
scientious Objectors seems to indicate that the treatment of those,
at least who are finally classified as conscientious objectors, will be
as satisfactory as can reasonably be expected.
REV. JOSEPH T. TINNELLY, C.M.
THE PROJECTOR'S REMEDIES TO ENFORCE A PROPERTY RIGHT
IN AiN IDEA*
Recently, the courts of New York have rendered several deci-
sions which involved the problem as to whether there is a property
right in an idea. All the courts have sustained the general rule of
law that an idea cannot be the subject of a property right 1 unless
the projector creates a contract protecting it,2 or reduces it to con-
crete form in order to subject it to patent or copyright. The word
"idea" covers a wide range of possibilities but, for convenience sake,
it is capable of being classified under three general divisions:
(A) Literary ideas, i.e., in a strict sense an artistic or dramatic writ-
ing or thought, as all ideas are literary until set into concrete form;
(B) mechanical ideas, i.e., new devices or inventions; (C) business
ideas, i.e., plans for development of business, trades secrets, etc. The
59 3 SELEcrIvE SERVICE REGULATIONS XXVII, 375, EXECUTrVE ORDER 8560,
Oct. 4, 1940. C. C. H. WAR LAW SERVICE 63,537.14.
* Acknowledgment is given to Andrew C. Hartnett, presently a member of
the St. Johi's Law Review staff, for his helpful co-operation.
I Haskins v. Ryan, 71 N. J. Eq. 574, 64 Atl. 436, aff'd, 75 N. J. Eq. 623,
73 AtL. 1118 (1909) ; Anderson v. Distler, 173 Misc. 261, 17 N. Y. S. (2d) 674
(1940).
2 Peabody v. Norfolk, 98 Mass. 452 (1868); Bristol v. Equitable Life
Assurance Society of N. Y., 132 N. Y. 264, 268 N. E. 506 (1892) ; Rodriquez
v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 259 App. Div. 224, 18 N. Y. S. (2d) 759 (1st
Dept. 1940) ; Stone v. Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co., et al., 260 App. Div. 450,
23 N. Y. S. (2d) 210 (1st Dept. 1940).
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problem raised in the cases is not difficult. It is the question of
whether there is a property right in an idea. Early decisions refused
to recognize any property right whatsoever,3 except in the field of
arts and sciences. At common law, literary men and dramatists,
prior to publication, had a property right in their ideas and unpub-
lished manuscripts. 4 But once the ideas involved were passed on to
another party, the author lost his rights therein forever. This was
the common law of copyright.5 The same is true of mechanical in-
ventions and ideas,6 as patent rights are of more modem origin.
7
But an abstract idea not reduced to concrete form could not be the
subject of a property right.8 More recent decisions have shown tre-
mendous variation of rules to be applied. In Haskins v. Ryan,9 there
is an absolute denial of any property in an idea. In Bristol v. Equi-
table Life Assurance Society,10 it is admitted that there is a possibility
of the existence of a property right, but insists that it be protected or
suffer loss. This is affirmed in numerous cases thereafter." Finally,
the court finds that ideas may be the subject of property rights.12
The trend of these decisions do tend toward rationalization of a rule
of law to be followed in any future case that may arise. It is neces-
sary to study the background of the principles involved herein, in
order to formulate a general guide to follow.
8 Denning v. Chapman, 11 How. Pr. 383 (N. Y. 1854) ; Williams v. Wil-
liams, 3 Meriv. 157, 36 Eng. Rep. 61 (1815) ; Newberry v. James, 2 Meriv. 446,
35 Eng. Rep. 1011 (1817). See note 1, sapra.
4 Wheaton & Donaldson v. Peters & Grigg, 8 Peters 591 (U. S. 1834);
Stern v. Laemmle Music Co., 74 Misc. 262, 133 N. Y. Supp. 1082 (1911); Miller
v. Taylor, 4 Burr. 2303, 98 Eng. Rep. 301 (1769).
5 Kortlander v. Bradford, 116 Misc. 664, 190 N. Y. Supp. 311 (1921).
648 C. J. §2.
7 In United States: U. S. CoNsT. Art. I, cl. 8. The first patent law pur-
suant to the Constitution was enacted April 10, 1790, 1 STAT. 109. In England:
Statute of Monopolies, St. 21 Jac. 1, c. 3 (1623).
8 See note 1, supra.
9 71 N. J. Eq. 574, 64 Atl. 436 (1906) (action in equity for an accounting
for profits realized from the use of complainant's idea for combining the entire
white lead industry; held, that there is no property right in an idea).
10 132 N. Y. 264, 268 N. E. 506 (1892) (action in equity for an accounting
for profits made from the use of the plaintiffs' idea for the sale of insurance;
held, that in the absence of protection by express contract there was no property
right in the idea itself).1 1 Lueddecke v. Chevrolet Motor Co., 70 F. (2d) 345 (C. C. A. 8th, 1934);
A. 0. Smith Corp. v. Petroleum Iron Works Co., 73 F. (2d) 531, inod'd, 74
F. (2d) 934 (C. C. A. 6th, 1935) ; Young v. Ralston-Purina Co., 88 F. (2d) 97
(C. C. A. 8th, 1937); Carter v. Baily, 64 Me. 458 (1874) ; Peabody v. Norfolk,
98 Mass. 452 (1868); Fendler v. Morocco, 253 N. Y. 281, 171 N. E. 56, re7.g,
217 App. Div. 791, 216 N. Y. Supp. 829 (1st Dept. 1926) ; Williamson v. New
York Central R. R., 258 App. Div. 226, 16 N. Y. S. (2d) 217 (2d Dept. 1939);
Rodriquez v. Western Union Tel. Co., 259 App. Div. 224, 18 N. Y. S. (2d) 759
(1st Dept. 1940) ; Stone v. Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co. et aiw, 260 App. Div.
450, 23 N. Y. S. (2d) 210 (1st Dept. 1940) ; Taft v. Smith, 76 Misc. 283, 134
N. Y. Supp. 1011 (1912); Anderson v. Distler, 173 Misc. 261, 17 N. Y. S. (2d)
674 (1940) ; Stein v. Morris, 120 Va. 390, 91 S. E. 177 (1917).
12 New Jersey Zinc Co. v. Signmaster, 4 F. Supp. 967, -nod'd, 71 F. (2d)




The law of patent rights and copyrights was created primarily
to protect authors and projectors of ideas which assumed a concrete
form or were of a mechanical design. Unfortunately, no basis has
been discovered to protect the intangible idea itself as it was created
in the mind of its author. Under the common law of patents, an
inventor had the material right to deprive the public of the benefits
of his invention by keeping it a secret.13 Once he disclosed it, the
public acquired the material right to use it, subject to the right of the
inventor to be protected against disclosure or use by one who ob-
tained his knowledge through fraud or breach of faith.' 4 The exclu-
sive right of the inventor was not recognized unless granted by the
sovereign authority.15 Today by statute 16 patent rights are created
for the protection of the ideas, together with a concrete portrayal
thereof. Immediately, the query arises as to why ideas are not pat-
ented. The answer is simple in that the mere existence of an intel-
lectual notion that a certain thing can be done, and if done, might be
of practical utility, does not furnish a basis for patent.' 7 Patentable
subject matter is enumerated and described in the statute and an
idea cannot be classed as an art, machine, or manufacture. 18 If it is
disassociated from definite design and description of machine,19 or
the means of reproduction are lacking, then an idea is not patent-
able.20 Therefore, an author of an idea cannot look to patent rights
for protection.
23 Westcott Church Co. v. Uneeda National Church Co., 122 App. Div. 260,
106 N. Y. Supp. 1016 (3d Dept. 1907); Rosenthal v. Goldstein, 112 Misc. 606,
183 N. Y. Supp. 582 (1920).
14 32 C. J. §§ 210-216.
25 Pomeroy Ink Co. v. Pomeroy, 77 N. J. Eq. 293, 78 Atl. 698 (1910).
16 U S. CONST. Art. I, § 8, cl. 8; 35 U. S. C. A. §§ 1-82, REv. STAT.
§§4883-4936 (1870) ; St. 21 Jac. 1, c. 3 (1623).
17 Rubber Tip Pencil Co. v. Howard, 20 Wall. 498 (U. S. 1874); Standard
Cartridge Co. v. Peters Cartridge Co., 77 Fed. 630 (C. C. A. 6th, 1896) -;
Westinghouse Electric Co. v. Saranac Lake Electric Light Co., 108 Fed. 221,
aff'd, 113 Fed. 884 (C. C. A. 2d, 1902); Aeolin Co. v. Cunningham Piano Co.,
251 Fed. 301, aff'd, 255 Fed. 897 (C. C. A. 3d, 1919) ; Foote v. Silsky, 9 Fed.
Cas. No. 4914 (1851),; Draper v. Potomaska Mills Corp., 7 Fed. Cas. No. 4072(1878); Wheaton v. Kendall, 85 Fed. 666 (1898); McEwan Bros. Co. v.
McEwan, 91 Fed. 787 (1899). "
18 Jacobs v. Baker, 7 Wall. 295 (U. S. 1869); U. S. Credit System v.
American Credit Indemnity Co., 53 Fed. 818, aff'd, 59 Fed. 139 (C. C. A. 2d,
1893); Berardini v. Tocci, 190 Fed. 329, aff'd, 200 Fed. 1021 (C. C. A. 2d,
1912); Guthrie v. Carlett, 10 F. (2d) 725 (C. C. A. 2d, 1926) ; Note (1908)
24 L. R. A. (Ni. s.) 665.
19 Measuregraph Co. v. Grand Rapids Show Case Co., 29 F. (2d) 263 (C.
C. A. 8th, 1928) ; Killifer Manufacturing Co. v. Duniba Associates, 67 F. (2d)
362 (C. C. A. 9th, 1933), cert. den., 54 Sup. Ct. 628, 292 U. S. 623 (1933);
O'Donnell v. United Shoe Machinery Corp., 2 F. Supp. 178 (1933).
20 Smith v. Downing, 22 Fed. Cas. No. 13036 (1850) ; Stephens, et al. v.
Salisbury, 22 Fed. Cas. No. 13369 (1855) ; Measuregraph Co. v. Grand Rapids
Show Case Co., 29 F. (2d) 263 (C. C. A. 8th, 1928); Johnson v. Duquesne
Light Co., 29 F. (2d) 784 (1928) ; Koppe v. Burnstingle, 29 F. (2d) 923 (1928).
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Similar in vein are the rules covering copyright, in which the
projector of an idea can find no comfort. At common law, an au-
thor had a property in his intellectual production before it had been
published, and could obtain redress from anyone who wrongfully used
it or obtained it by fraud.2 ' The United States has continued this
common law doctrine in conjunction with the statutory copyright
acts.22  In England, copyright is fixed strictly by statute, and the
common law has been eliminated.23  However, this property right
created by copyright is in the result of intellectual productions: it is
in the intellectual conception 2 4 and is not limited to the exact form
in which the author has expressed his ideas. Such property is not
in ideas in the abstract, for mere ideas are not the subject of private
property,2 5 but it exists" only in the concrete form of its expression,
and are the exclusive property of the author as long as they are not
published.2 6 They need not be reduced to writing as long as they
are identifiable. 27  All ideas while still in the abstract are literary
in nature and, as such, subject to literary rules of copyright. But the
form and concrete expression of an idea alone can be copyrighted.28
Once the idea has been divulged by publication the rights therein are
forever lost.2 9  The copyright merely protects the arrangement and
manner of composition and not the words used or the ideas contained
therein.3 0  Therefore, common law copyright combined with statu-
21 Holmes v. Hurst, 174 U. S. 82, 19 Sup. Ct. 606 (1899); American
Tobacco Co. v. Werchmeister, 207 U. S. 284, 28 Sup. Ct. 72 (1907) ; Caliga v.
Inter Ocean Newspaper Co., 215 U. S. 182, 30 Sup. Ct. 38 (1909) ; Frohman v.
Ferris, 238 Ill. 430, 87 N. E: 327 (1909) ; Isaacs v. Daly, 39 N. Y. Super. 511
(1874); Palmer v. De Witt, 47 N. Y. 532 (1872); Stern v. Carl Laemmle
Music Co., 74 Misc. 262, 133 N. Y. Supp. 1082, aff'd, 155 App. Div. 895, 139
N. Y. Supp. 1146 (lst Dept. 1913); Caird v. Sime, 12 App. Cas. 326 (1887);
Exchange Tel; Co. v. Gregory [1896] 1 Q. B. 147; Note 43 L. I. A. (N. s.)
630; see note 3, supra:
2235 STAT. 1075, c. 320, §2, 17 U. S. C. A. §2 (1909).2 3 St. 1 & 2 GEo. V, c. 46, § 31 (1911).
24 Holmes v. Hurst, 174 U. S. 82, 19 Sup. Ct. 606 (1899) ; Universal Film
Mfg. Co. v. Copperman, 218 Fed. 577, affd, 212 Fed. 301 (C. C. A. 2d, 1914);
Maxwell v. Gordon, 93 Fed. 665 (1899) ; Taft v. Smith, 76 Misc. 283, 134 N. Y.
Supp. 1011 (1912).
25 Perris v. Hexamer, 99 U. S. 674 (1878); Stowe v. Thomas, 23 Fed.
Cas. No. 1351 (1853) ; Brunell v. Chown, 69 Fed. 993 (1895) ; Werchmeister v.
Springer Lithograph Co., et al., 134 Fed. 321 (C. C. A. 2d, 1904) ; Carter v.
Bailey, 64 Me. 458 (1874) ; Ortel v. Wood, 40 How. Pr. 10 (N. Y. 1870) ; Taft
v. Smith, 76 Misc. 283, 134 N. Y. Supp. 1011 (1912) ; Jeffrys v. Boosey, 4 H. L.
Cas. 815, 10 Eng. Rep. 681 (1854); Cartwright v. Wharton, 25 Ont. L. 357,
20 Ont. W. R. 853 (1912).
26 Aronson v. Baker, 43 N. J. Eq. 365, 12 AtI. 177 (1887); Wright v.
Eisle, 86 App. Div. 356, 83 N. Y. Supp. 887 (2d Dept. 1903).
27 White-Smith Music Pub. Co. v. Apollo Co., 139 Fed. 427, aft'd, 147 Fed.
226, aff'd, 209 U. S. 1, 28 Sup. Ct. 319 (1908) ; Walter v. Lane [1900] A. C.
539.
28 Holmes v. Hurst, 174 U. S. 82, 19 Sup. Ct. 606 (1899).
29 Baker v. Selden, 101 U. S. 99 (1879) ; Holmes v. Hurst, 174 U. S. 82,
19 Sup. Ct. 606 (1899) ; Carter v. Bailey, 64 Me. 458 (1874).
30 Dymow v. Bolton, 11 F. (2d) 690 (C. C. A. 2d, 1926) ; Moore v. Ford
[ VOL.. 15
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tory regulation offers no protection to the author for his ideas. It
is necessary that the author disclose his idea in order to turn them
into concrete form so that he may realize an economic gain therefrom.
III
As the author has no protection in copyright and does not come
within patent rights, the next query is how can the projector of an
idea acquire rights and protection? Theoretically, the definition of
property would appear to include a right in an idea,3' but the de-
cisions have excluded ideas as subjects of property,32 although au-
thors have been granted a literary property in manuscripts or con-
tents thereof.33 Often an idea has become a trade secret or developed
into a formula which cannot be patented for fear of disclosure. Prop-
erty rights are recognized in these ideas,34 although early decisions
at first denied it on the strength of the general rule which guides the
courts today in the law of ideas. 35 The problem created by trade
secrets is analogous to the problem of property rights in an idea.
Where the abstract idea is new and novel, it becomes a trade secret
and as such, proprietary rights attach thereto.36 A trade secret is
the idea expressed in concrete form. This concrete form is protected
as property against use or disclosure obtained by fraud or breach of
Motor Co., 28 F. (2d) 529, aff'd, 43 F. (2d) 685 (C. C. A. 2d, 1930) ; Leroys
v. O'Neil, 49 F. (2d) 603 (1931); Downes v. Culbertson, 153 Misc. 14, 275
N. Y. Supp. 233 (1934).
31 The term "Property" is none, generalissimium and includes everything
which is the subject of ownership, corporeal or incorporeal, tangible or intan-
gible, visible or invisible, real or personal; everything that has an exchangeable
value or which goes to make up wealth or estate. Hoyd v. Citizens Bank of
Albany Co., 89 F. (2d) 105 (C. C. A. 6th, 1937) ; Wapsie Power & Light Co.
v. City of Tipton, 197 Iowa 996, 193 N. W. 643 (1923); McAlister v. Pritchard,
287 Mo. 494, 230 S. W. 66 (1921). "Property" is anything that may be the
subject of ownership. In re Delaney, 256 N. Y. 315, 176 N. E. 407, rev'g, 230
App. Div. 821, 244 N. Y. Supp. 833 (1st Dept. 1931).
32 Trover will not lie for conversion of ideas where the physical plans were
not used, the court observing that it knew of no authority where an action had
been sustained for anything so intangible as an idea not connected with some-
thing tangible. Mackay, et al. v. Benj. Franklin Realty & Holding Co., 288 Pa.
207, 135 Adt. 613 (1927) ; 6 R. C. L. (1915) 1097, § 3.
33 Frohman v. Ferris, 238 Ill. 430, 87 N. E. 327, aff'd, 223 U. S. 424, 32
Sup. Ct. 263 (1912) ; Palmer v. De Witt, 47 N. Y. 532, 537 (1872); Bateman
v. Ryder, 106 Tenn. 712, 64 S. W. 48 (1901) ; see note 4, supra.
34 Durand v. Brown, 236 Fed. 609 (C. C. A. 6th, 1916) ; Coca-Cola Bottling
Co. v. Coca Cola Co., 269 Fed. 796 (1920).
35 Dening v. Chapman, 11 How. Pr. 382 (N. Y. 1854) ; Newberry v. James,
2 M[eriv. 446, 35 Eng. Rep. 1011 (1917) ; Williams v. Williams, 3 Meriv. 160,
36 Eng. Rep. 61 (1817).
3 3 Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co. v. Meyer, 101 Ind. App. 420, 194 N. E. 206
(1935); Eastman Co. v. Reichenback, 20 N. Y. Supp. 110, affd, 29 N. Y. Supo.
1143 (1894); Ryan & Associates v. Century Brewing Ass'n, 185 Wash. 600,
55 P. (2d) 1053 (1936).
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confidence.37 If knowledge is gained by other than surreptitious means,
then the acquirer has the right to use his knowledge so acquired.3 3
By transposing these rules to a concrete case, the reasoning applied in
Anderson v. Distler 3 9 is recognized. In that case an insurance agent
gave the defendant a valuable suggestion to retain insurance on a
third party, and by following it defendant realized1 very handsomely
on a small outlay of money. Plaintiff sought compensation for the
use of his idea. Held, that in the absence of a property right in an
idea, and lacking a contract for compensation for the disclosure, plain-
tiff failed to sustain his cause of action. While an idea in the abstract
cannot become the subject of a property right, still the decisions point
out that the author can protect his idea by a contract. No decision
states whether it is the idea that is protected or the act of disclosure
by projector.
There should be no problem in the law of ideas for the courts
to decide in the face of an express contract against disclosure to third
parties, or in the use of an idea obtained as a result of the protection
rendered by the contract. Such contract must be clear and definite
as to terms and subject matter or it will be unenforceable as too in-
definite, 40 or as a contract to make a contract.41 Compensation for
the use of an abstract idea is usually sought in equity on an implied
or quasi contract. A review of the decisions, however, fails to show
one instance wherein the implied contract is upheld.42 As for sus-
taining a quasi contract on equitable grounds, the courts fall back on
37 Eli Lilly & Co. v. Warner & Co., 268 Fed. 156, rev'd, 275 Fed. 752 (C.
C. A. 3d, 1922), rezvd, 265 U. S. 526. 44 Sup. Ct. 615 (1923); Allen-Qualley
Co., et al. v. Shellmar Prod. Co., 31 F. (2d) 293, affd, 36 F. (2d) 623 (C. C.
A. 7th,'1929) ; Peabody v. Norwalk, 98 Mass. 452 (1868) ; Chadwick v. Covell,
151 Mass. 190, 23 N. E. 1068 (1890); Tabor v. Hoffman, 118 N. Y. 30, 23
N. E. 12 (1889); Simmons Hardware Co. v. Waibel, 1 S. D. 488, 47 N. W.
810 (1891) ; Smith v. Dickinson, 3 Bos. & P. 630, 127 Eng. Rep. 339 (1804) ;
Yovatt v. Winyard, 1 Jac. & W. 394, 37 Eng. Rep. 425 (1820); Morison v.
Moat, 9 Hare 241, 68 Eng. Rep. 492 (1851); Hamlyn v. Houston [1903] 1 K.
B. 81; Note (1891) 11 L. R. A. 267.38 Affiliated Enterprises v. Gruber, 86 F. (2d) 958 (C. C. A. 1st, 1937):
Stewart v. Hook, 118 Ga. 445, 45 S. E. 369 (1903) ; Chadwick v. Covell, 151
Mass. 190, 23 N. E. 1068 (1890) ; Watkins v. Landon, 52 Minn. 389, 54 N. W.
193 (1893); Note (1889) 6 L. R. A. 839; Note (1893) 19 L. R. A. 236; Note
(1904) 63 L. R. A. 255. See also Champlin v. Stoddart, 30 Hun 300 (N. Y.
1883).
3 173 Misc. 261, 17 N. Y. S. (2d) 674 (1940).
40 Stern v. Premier Shirt Corp., 260 N. Y. 201, 183 N. E. 363, aff'g in part,
235 App. Div. 722, 255 N. Y. Supp. 964 (1st Dept. 1932); Sears v. N. Y.
Hippodrome Corp., 104 Misc. 240, 171 N. Y. Supp. 181 (1918).
However, the courts will maintain an action for an injunction to enforce a
negative promise which here would be an agreement not to disclose the idea
given. Lumley v. Wagner, 1 De G. M. & J. 604, 42 Eng. Rep. 687 (1852).
4" Haskins v. Ryan, 71 N. J. Eq. 574, 64 AtI. 436 (1906), aff'd, 75 N. J. Eq.
623, 73 Atl. 1118 (1908).
42 Bristol v. Equitable Life Assurance Society of N. Y., 132 N. Y. 264,
268 N. E. 506 (1892); Rodriquez v. Western Union Tel. Co., 259 App. Div.
224, 18 N. Y. S. (2d) 759 (1st Dept. 1940) ; Stone v. Liggett & Myers Tobacco
Co. et ano., 260 App. Div. 450, 23 N. Y. S. (2d) 210 (1st Dept. 1940).
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the primary theory that ideas have no property, and hence the party
who makes use of an idea that has been divulged to him is not un-
justly enriched by use of property for which he has not paid.43 The
divulgence was at the risk of the projector who should have taken
steps to protect his idea.
IV
A study of the more recent cases which have evolved the present
day law of ideas discloses that it follows the common law of copyright
and trade secrets. In Bristol v. Equitable Life Assurance Society 44
an accounting was sought in equity for the defendant's use of a system
of soliciting life insurance. The plaintiff claimed he had disclosed
this to the defendant in a letter asking for employment. No contract
against use or disclosure was alleged or proven. The court held
that the system was not new and novel so as to partake of the nature
of a trade secret and thus be free from danger of use or disclosure.
It went on to say that the originator or proprietor of an idea should
protect himself upon disclosure by a contract guarding and regulating
the disclosure, or the idea upon its divulgence could be used by any-
one acquiring knowledge thereof. The court did not deny that an
idea could be the subject of a property right; nor did it state how the
property right was acquired.
Subsequently, the New Jersey court decided the case of Haskins
v. Ryan.45 This was also an action for an accounting for profits de-
rived from the use 6f plaintiff's idea. Haskins had conceived of a
plan to combine all the white lead industry in the United States. He
sought the financial aid of Ryan, which necessitated full disclosure
of his plan. Ryan at first was extremely cooperative, but before be-
coming too deeply involved, he told the plaintiff that he could not
give him the necessary financial support. This caused Haskins to
abandon his idea. However, Ryan later developed the plan and made
a large profit from its operation. There was no allegation of any
contract to protect plaintiff's rights in the idea. The court held that
an idea was something over which the originator had no dominion,
as an idea depended upon further acts to bring it to realization. Such
an idea could scarcely be called property. It has never, in the ab-
sence of contract or statute, been held that mere ideas are capable of
legal ownership or protection.
These two cases form the basis of all subsequent cases dealing
with the subject. They have been affirmed countless times on the rule
43 Haskins v. Ryan, 71 N. J. Eq. 574, 64 Ati. 436 (1906), aff'd, 75 N. J. Eq.
623, 73 Atl. 1118 (1909); Bristol v. Equitable Life Assurance Society of N. Y.,
132 N. Y. 264, 268 N. E. 506 (1892).
44 132 N. Y. 264, 268 N. E. 506 (1892).
45 71 N. 3. Eq. 574, 64 Atl. 436 (1906), aff'd, 75 N. J. Eq. 623, 73 Atl. 1118
(1909).
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of law that a method, scheme or idea could not be the subject of a
property right. In Stein v. Morris,46 the complainant sought an ac-
counting for the use of an idea which brought about the development
of the "Morris Plan Bank". Plaintiff sought to bind defendant on
theory that the plan was divulged in confidence under a promise of
secrecy. The court, after rejecting the claim of a property right,
refused to sustain the claim of breach of confidence and a negative
contract. It stated that the very nature of the idea demanded divul-
gence to the public in order to perfect it. It should be noted that
here the court did not reject the theory of a breach of confidence, but
merely held that no such agreement was proven.
In a more recent case, Moore v. Ford Motor Co.,47 the court
upheld the reasoning of prior decisions that property rights do not
exist in an idea. But it did say that the originator may impose such
conditions as he may see fit in return for his disclosure. 4  This case
presents the interesting problem of whether a negative contract pre-
venting disclosure will be enforced. Logically, one would say 'yes"
in that parties may contract concerning what they wish and, unless
public policy prevents, it will be enforced. But in view of the com-
mon law guiding the courts, one would be reluctant to say such a
contract is enforceable. The courts consistently refuse recognition of
an idea as property unless reduced to concrete form, such as a trade
secret or process. Thus a contract to prevent disclosure is merely an
agreement concerning a subject matter to which the courts give no
recognition. However, it is possible that, when such a situation does
present itself to the courts, the reasoning in Moore v. Ford Motor Co.
will be applied, i.e., while an idea cannot be the subject of a property
right, the parties may create a property therein by express contract,
which contract will be enforced. As a contract for compensation for
disclosure of the idea will be enforced, 49 why cannot a contract pre-
venting disclosure, even though the idea is not used, be enforced?
There is only one case, Anderson v. Distler,5 ° that specifically holds
that an idea cannot be the subject matter of a contract. However,
the court limits this statement by stating that "there may be property
in an idea, trade secret or system * * * ' The logical implication
is that the court in its first statement was referring to abstract ideas
46 120 Va. 390, 91 S. E. 177 (1917).
47 28 F. (2d) 529, aff'd, 43 F. (2d) 685 (C. C. A. 2d, 1930).
48 "1 think that it would be going further than the courts have gone or
should go, in absence of some agreement or a judiciary relationship, to hold that
where one imparts a mere idea to another and that one acts upon it and profits
thereby, he is liable for the profits derived. Obviously a contrary rule would
place a serious limitation upon industry, and would be impractical, and, of
course, no one needs disclose his idea, except upon his terms" (citing as authority
the Bristol, Stein, Hamilton and Haskins cases). Moore v. Ford Motor Co.,
28 F. (2d) 529, aff'd, 43 F. (2d) 685 (C. C. A. 2d, 1930).
49 Bristol v. Equitable Life Assurance Society of New York, 132 N. Y.
264, 268 N. E. 506 (1892); Shapiro v. Press Publishing Co, Inc., 235 App.
Div. 698, 255 N. Y. Supp. 899 (2d Dept. 1932).
50 173 Misc. 261, 17 N. Y. S. (2d) 674 (1940).
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that had no semblance of concreteness and had not been perfected as
yet. Not too much reliance can be placed on that decision as author-
ity for the proposition that an idea cannot be the subject of a con-
tract, as the supporting decision cited in no way substantiates the
claim. It merely holds that an idea is not the subject of a property,
but it may be protected by contract. Even conceding the argument
in the Anderson case, it raises the question of what will guide the
court as to when an idea becomes concrete enough in substance to
be the subject of a contract. That would necessarily become a ques-
tion of fact for a jury. Consequently, all causes of action on. an idea
would then be valid, the question to be decided by the jury. To
carry the problem one step further, and to allow an idea to become a
proper subject for contract only after it assumes concrete form, is
to place it in the category of a trade secret. This does not create a
problem, but ends our initial problem, as it is a well-known rule of
law that a trade secret is a proprietary right and protected from dis-
closure by contractY1 But it is not possible that the opinions written
on property rights in ideas limited their statements to ideas that have
assumed a concrete form because there is no problem involved there.
When the decisions warned the originator that he must protect him-
self by contract, they referred to abstract ideas in their intangible
state.
The entire problem of property rights in ideas has been the sub-
ject of three very recent cases both in the federal courts and in New
York. In Ketcham v. New York World's Fair 1939, Inc.,5 2 the
court recognized the plaintiff's property right in an idea, but ren-
dered a decision for the defendant due to the failure to show an in-
vasion of the right by a use of the idea. The plaintiff had developed
a color chart for the World's Fair buildings, together with sugges-
tions in its use. He claimed that the defendant had made use of his
ideas, and was therefore entitled to an accounting. "The court did
recognize that plaintiff had a property right in his original intellec-
tual production in its concrete form, and that he could contract and
impose such restrictions in the use thereof as he saw fit, but that
once he disclosed it by publication, the property right, in absence of
contract, was lost. However, the Court went on to say that plaintiff
failed to show in any respect that the defendant had made use of the
ideas furnished and, unless plaintiff's recognized property right was
injured, he could not recover.
In a later case, the United States Supreme Court affirmed the
common law rule of copyright. Fashion Originators Guild v.
F. T. C.,53 involved an appeal from a "cease and desist" order of the
Federal Trade Commission for certain "unfair trade practices".
51 See notes 34, 37, supra.
52 Ketcham v. New York World's Fair, 1939, Inc., 34 F. Supp. 657 (1940).
53 Fashion Originators' Guild v. Federal Trade Commission, 114 F. (2d)
SO. aff'd. 61 Sup. Ct. 703 (U. S. 1941).
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Plaintiff was an association of dressmakers and dealers who had com-
bined in order to prevent style piracy and insure fair trade among
dress dealers and manufacturers. All members of the Guild made
their dresses from designs created by the various members of the
association, and by forms of boycott sought to prevent non-members
from copying the designs. These designs were neither patented nor
copyrighted, although they were registered in the association. The
Circuit Court of Appeals delved into the common law of property
in ideas and recognized the property right, but only in its original and
unpublished state. Once these designs were made into dresses and
offered to the general public for sale, it was a publication that de-
prived the originator of his common law property. The court went
on to say that the Constitution and copyright statutes did not give
the author a property right in a concrete idea forever. This prop-
erty right did not survive publication, and the author's sole remedy
is to have the copyright law changed so as to allow ideas to be regis-
tered and protected as originals. This would not prevent copies from
being made, but they would have to be so designated. The Supreme
Court in its affirmance recognized the property right in concrete
ideas, but would not permit the plaintiff, in seeking to protect this
property after publication, to indulge in unfair trade practices.
Perhaps the last word in this problem is stated very succinctly
in the decision of Alberts v. Remington Rand, Inc.5 4 In most of
the cases discussed previously, we have found a property right, but
it has been so created because the idea has been reduced to concrete
form or has been made the subject of an express contract. In such
cases, the courts quickly protect and enforce the rights. But in the
Alberts decision, the distinction between an idea in its concrete form
and one still in the abstract is clearly demonstrated. In this decision
the plaintiff sought to recover on two causes of action. The first one
proceeded on the theory that plaintiff's original idea had been used
and defendant had not paid therefor, despite an express contract to
do so. It was conceded that that stated a valid cause of action. Re-
covery in the second cause of action was based upon the defendant's
liability for the reasonable value of the idea on the theory of an im-
plied contract. In granting a motion to dismiss this cause of action,
the court stated what is undoubtedly the rule of law followed in the
couits of the United States: I
In the absence of an express agreement the originator or proprietor of an
idea, trade secret or system which cannot be sold, negotiated or used without
disclosure, cannot hold another liable if he uses the idea for his own benefit.
54 175 Misc. 486, 23 N. Y. S. (2d) 894 (1940) (Action to recover for the
use of an idea submitted to defendant. The idea consisted of a written sugges-
tion that defendant make a chart or graph of the direction in which hairs on the
face grow and that the chart be issued to customers as an aid in the use of
defendant's razors).




* * * Only where the idea has been reduced to concrete form prior to its dis-
closure to and appropriation by the defendant may recovery be had upon an
implied contract.
This case clarifies the rule laid down in Anderson v. Distler.56
There the court referred to abstract ideas and stated that they could
not be the subject of a property right or a contract. The better rule
is that they may be the subject of a contract as parties may contract
concerning anything that is not illegal or contrary to public policy,
and once the idea is made the subject of a contract, then no matter
how abstract in form it may be, the idea is protected.
V
Much as it is desired to support the originator or inventor of an
idea and create a property right therein, in the face of the definite
stand taken by all the courts, it would be difficult to reverse them-
selves and create a property right where they claim none existed. A
careful analysis of the decisions shows two common elements. The
originator may protect himself by an express contract. No property
right or implied contract will be recognized. Naturally, obtaining
an express contract is not a simple procedure, as most people wish
to know something about which they contract. Also, the court will
only enforce the contract if it is definite and not merely an agreement
to agree, which is unenforceable.5 7 Because of the difficulties sur-
rounding the creation of a contract, the best remedy to protect the
author of an idea is by legislative enactment creating a property right
in ideas. The definition of "property" is general enough 1; so that
ideas can be classified as intangible, incorporeal property and, as
such, subject to protection as any other personal property.
ROBERT M. POST.
CORPORATION STOcK REPURCHASE AGREEMENTS; MUTUALITY OF
OBLIGATION AND ILLUSORY PROMISES
A corporation, subject to the provisions of its charter and by-
laws, has the inherent power to purchase its own stock.1 Such power
56 See note 39, supra.
57 See note 41, supra.
58 See note 31, supra.
1 West Penn. Chemical and Mfg. Co. v. Prentice, 236 Fed. 891 (C. C. A.
3d, 1916); Verplanck v. Ins. Co., 11 Edw. Ch. 84 (N. Y. 1831); City Bank of
Columbus v. Bruce and Fox, 17 N. Y. 510 (1858); Laue v. Bethlehem Steel
Corp., 243 App. Div. 57, 276 N. Y. Supp. 173 (1st Dept. 1934).
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